

## NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

### G-6 Military and Military-Economic Intelligence

Elements of the Directorate of Intelligence which are responsible for military and military-economic intelligence production were consolidated into a single office -- the Office of Strategic Research -- at the beginning of the fiscal year. The consolidation resulted from a recognition of the need for closer intermeshing of the research and current intelligence reporting activities in this field, which is distinctive from other aspects of the Directorate's work in terms of sources, analytical techniques, and consumer requirements. It provides a single office which other agency components and other government agencies can look to for military and military-economic intelligence support.

In its first year of operation OSR has progressed in several analytical areas which are important to our understanding of foreign military capabilities and how they may develop in the future.

In response to a requirement from the Secretary of Defense in May 1967, OSR undertook a joint study with DIA on Soviet capabilities to reinforce their ground forces deployed against NATO in Central Europe. The effort has required the commitment of substantial personnel resources and the development of new analytical techniques for intensive exploitation large

volumes of raw data [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The research is still going on, but already it has yielded new information on the equipment levels of Soviet divisions which has substantially altered previous estimates. The scope and intensity of the study have produced results in which we have a high degree of confidence. Further research during the coming year will broaden the base of this study and is expected to provide a more precise understanding of the combat readiness and reinforcement capabilities of Soviet forces in the western USSR and Eastern Europe.

Our understanding of Soviet strategic attack forces improved as a result of an exhaustive study of the

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[REDACTED] OSR analysts utilized the

full spectrum of intelligence sources [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] to

find out what happened [REDACTED]

and to

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analyze its significance in terms of what revealed about Soviet strategy and tactics.

A new approach to the problem of forecasting future Soviet ABM deployment possibilities was developed by relating the pattern of Soviet expenditures for other advanced weapon systems to the ABM program. This approach, drawing on previous studies of Soviet military expenditures and priorities which the Soviets have revealed in deploying earlier defensive systems, is intended to improve our analytical attack on the question of what the Soviets intend to do in the ABM field.

Communist China continues to be a more difficult subject for military and military-economic analysis than the Soviet Union. China's military programs are more obscure, and evidence on them is harder to obtain. [REDACTED] has been the most productive intelligence source, and OSR has exploited it to obtain some measure of the effects of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese military programs, to estimate the progress of advanced weapons programs, and to assess developments in deployed forces. A continuing effort has been maintained to gauge the extent and nature of the Chinese military presence in North Vietnam [REDACTED]

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A persistent challenge for OSR analysts is the problem of handling the large amounts of diverse data collected on military subjects and synthesizing it to produce meaningful conclusions. OSR has turned increasingly to the computer to assist in this process.

With the assistance of other Agency offices, basic data have been converted to machine form to the extent that personnel resources allowed. The analysis done for the joint ground forces study, for example, led to the beginning a computerized file which holds promise for application to many aspects of military intelligence problems.

A second approach has involved the use of computer models to correlate and manipulate data on a given subject as an analytical tool. Several models have been under development for some time and they have recently begun to realize some of their potential. One such model became operational in 1968 and is now used to assist in assessing the probable Soviet view of the US-USSR strategic relationship and evaluating the effectiveness of alternative Soviet reactions to that view.

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Another model, a prototype, has been programmed and partially tested. It is designed to assess of the feasibility of alternative projections of military programs and the implications of those programs in terms of competing Soviet policy objectives.

A third model has been used for several years to generate detailed cost data for estimating Soviet expenditures on military programs and forces. The capabilities of this model are being expanded by the addition of new routines encompassing additional areas of analysis. It is compatible with and supports the other two programs.

The results of OSR research and analysis were expressed in many forms in the course of the year: contributions to national military estimates, formal memoranda and reports, handbooks, direct replies to specific intelligence questions from other agencies of government, briefings, and consultations with senior policy officials.

The Soviet decision in late June to ~~begin~~ discussions with the US on strategic arms ~~limitations~~ resulted in added requirements for OSR services. The office has supported the Arms Control and Disarma-

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ment Agency and other agencies involved in the forthcoming talks by providing up-to-date substantive information and guidance on intelligence aspects of the monitoring problem. It has worked closely with the Office of National Estimates in the production of estimates related to this question. As proposals and counterproposals unfold during the talks, OSR's support efforts will probably need to expand.

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G-1 Current Intelligence

Current reporting on military and military-related scientific and technical matters was shifted on 1 July 1967 to the Office of Strategic Research, where it supports and is supported by the research components of the office.

OSR monitors military developments in both Communist and Free World countries, focusing on those whose military postures and actions influence US policies and programs. Significant current developments are reported through the publications of the Office of Current Intelligence. A new production medium which became available during the past year--the all-source "Black Book" in the new Central Intelligence Bulletin format--has provided an outlet for timely reporting of military intelligence obtained [REDACTED]

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OSR performs the current reporting function for military-related scientific and technical intelligence. It works closely with the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center, which are responsible for the Agency's research and analysis in this field.

When critical situations develop that involve military forces--such as the Pueblo seizure, the ~~Arab~~-Israeli

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war, and the recent Soviet-Czech confrontation--OSR makes available a team of experienced production and coordination managers to serve on task forces created to report on them around the clock.

G-2 National Intelligence Estimates

Support of the national estimative process is a major concern of the Office of Strategic Research. During the past year the Office has developed detailed management controls over its intelligence production so that research on the major military problems builds toward and culminates in inputs to the annual military estimates.

The Office also gives extensive support to preparation of the National Intelligence Projections for Planning, which are used in US defense planning as the authoritative source of information on Soviet military forces structures and the costs of military resources.